Nebraska has long adhered to the "employment-at-will" doctrine and has recognized, in many cases, a contract exception to that doctrine. See, e.g., Stratton v. Chevrolet Motor Division, 229 Neb. 771, 428 N.W.2d 910 (1988); Johnston v. Panhandle Coop Ass'n, 225 Neb. 732, 408 N.W.2d 261 (1987); Mau v. Omaha National Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 1980); see also Rains v. Becton Dickinson & Company, 246 Neb. 746, 523 N.W.2d 506 (1994). While the Nebraska Supreme Court has declined to adopt a "good faith and fair dealing" exception to the doctrine, White v. Ardan, Inc., 230 Neb. 11, 430 N.W.2d 27 (1988), the Court has recognized, in a few cases, a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
Mau v. Omaha National Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980) was the first Nebraska case which discussed a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Some years later, in Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd., 226 Neb. 899, 416 N.W.2d 510 (1987), the Court first discussed the exception in detail:
We believe that it is important that abusive discharge claims of employees at will be limited to manageable and clear standards. The right of an employer to terminate employees at will should be restricted to exceptions created by statute or those instances where a very clear mandate of public policy has been violated.
Id. at 905, 416 N.W.2d at 515. The plaintiff in Ambroz had been terminated for failing to agree to a polygraph examination, in violation of the Nebraska Licensing of Truth and Deception Examiners Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1901 et. seq,. and successfully argued a public policy violation. That Act established criminal penalties for violation of the Act, but no civil remedies were provided.
The next year, the Nebraska Supreme Court decided Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 228 Neb. 85, 421 N.W.2d 755 (1988), a case which involved a termination based upon an employee's reporting of odometer fraud. The Court reaffirmed the existence of the public policy exception, but held that courts should proceed cautiously when declaring public policy, in the absence of some particular prior legislation or case law on the subject. The Court dismissed the case, finding that Plaintiff did not have a good faith belief that Nebraska's odometer statute had been violated.
Thereafter, in Blair v. Physicians Mutual Insurance Co., 242 Neb. 652, 496 N.W.2d 483 (1993), the Court, oddly enough, stated that it had not yet recognized a public policy exception, a holding which was obviously in conflict with prior cases. A few other cases since Blair have recognized the exception. See Malone v. American Business Information Co., 262 Neb. 737, 634 N.W.2d 788 (2000) (recognizing the exception, but finding it inapplicable in a situation alleging discharge in violation of the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act); Simonsen v. Hendricks Sodding & Landscaping, 5 Neb. App. 263, 558 N.W.2d 825 (1997) (public policy exception applies where employee refused to drive a truck due to defective brakes -- doing so is violation of criminal statute).
A public policy exception has been recognized in many states based upon terminations relating to the filing of a worker's compensation claim. See, e.g., Heldebrand v. Roadmaster Corp., 277 Ill.App.3d 664, 660 N.E.2d 1354, 214 Ill. Dec. 405 (1996); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558 (Iowa 1988); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee Co. Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan.App.2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (Ct. App. 1976); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (1980); Mantha v. Liquid Carbonic Indus., Inc., 1992 Okla.Civ.App. 28, 839 P.2d 200 (Ct. App. 1992); Brown v. Transom Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Shick v. Shirey, 552 Pa. 590, 716 A.2d 1231 (1998); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Kunze, 747 S.W.2d 826 (Tex.Ct.App. 1987); Lankford v. True Ranches, Inc., 822 P.2d 868 (Wyo. 1991). Indeed, in a good number of states the exception had its genesis in Worker's Compensation retaliation claims. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton, supra; Sventko, supra. Curiously, no reported Nebraska decisions had dealt with the issue until quite recently.
In Jackson v. Morris Communications Corp., 265 Neb. 423, 657 N.W.2d 634 (2003) (decided March 7, 2003), the Nebraska Supreme Court specifically recognized the exception in a worker's compensation situation:
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act was promulgated to serve an important public purpose, and a rule which allows fear of retaliation for the filing of a claim undermines that policy. We are convinced that the unique and beneficent nature of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act presents a clear mandate of public policy which warrants application of the public policy exception. Thus, we recognize a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine and allow an action for retaliatory discharge when an employee has been discharged for filing a worker's compensation claim.
Id. at 432, 657 N.W.2d at 640-641.
While the Nebraska courts have not provided a great deal of case law dealing with the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, the list of areas in which a public policy claim may be advanced now includes retaliation for seeking benefits under Nebraska's Worker's Compensation statute.
This article is provided by Fraser Stryker for general informational purposes and is not intended to be and should not be construed as legal advice on any specific facts or circumstances. Please contact Robert F. Rossiter, Jr. at 402-978-5261 with any specific questions.